

APPOINTMENT OF HON. DIANA
DeGETTE TO ACT AS SPEAKER
PRO TEMPORE TO SIGN EN-
ROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESO-
LUTIONS ON TODAY

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be-
fore the House the following commu-
nication from the Speaker:

NANCY PELOSI,
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, March 11, 2022.

I hereby appoint the Honorable DIANA
DeGETTE to act as Speaker pro tempore to
sign enrolled bills and joint resolutions on
this day.

NANCY PELOSI,
Speaker.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without
objection, the appointment is ap-
proved.

There was no objection.

JOINT EXPLANATORY MATERIAL
STATEMENT ON THE INTEL-
LIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022, SUB-
MITTED BY MR. SCHIFF, CHAIR-
MAN OF THE HOUSE PERMA-
NENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

The following is the Joint Explanatory
Statement (the “Explanatory Statement”)
to the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2022 (“the Act”), which has been
included as Division X of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022. The Explanatory
Statement reflects the result of negotiations
and disposition of issues reached between the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(“SSCI”) and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) (to-
gether, the “Committees”). The Explanatory
Statement shall have the same effect with
respect to the implementation of the Act as
if it were a joint explanatory statement of a
conference committee.

The Explanatory Statement comprises
three parts: an overview of the application of
the annex to accompany this statement; a
statement on anomalous health incidents;
and unclassified congressional direction.

PART I: APPLICATION OF THE CLASSIFIED ANNEX
AND SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS

The classified nature of U.S. intelligence
activities prevents the Committees from
publicly disclosing many details concerning
their final decisions regarding funding levels
and policy direction. Therefore, in addition
to the Schedule of Authorizations a classi-
fied annex to the Act—referred to here and
within the annex itself as the “Agree-
ment”—has been prepared to describe in de-
tail the scope and intent of the Committees’
actions.

The Agreement supersedes the classified
annexes that accompanied H.R. 5412 and S.
2610; and reconciles differences between the
Committees, with respect to the National In-
telligence Program (NIP). The Agreement
also makes recommendations for the Mili-
tary Intelligence Program (MIP) and the In-
formation Systems Security Program (ISSP). The Agreement authorizes the Intel-
ligence Community (IC) to obligate and ex-
pend funds not altered or modified by the
classified Schedule of Authorizations as re-
quested in the President’s budget, subject to
modification under applicable reprogram-
ming procedures.

The classified Schedule of Authorizations
is incorporated into the bill pursuant to Sec-
tion 102. It has the status of law. The Agree-

ment supplements and adds detail to clarify
the authorization levels found in the bill and
the classified Schedule of Authorizations.

The Committees view direction and rec-
ommendations, whether contained in the Ex-
planatory Statement or in the Agreement, as
requiring compliance by the Executive
Branch.

PART II: STATEMENT REGARDING ANOMALOUS
HEALTH INCIDENTS

From the time the Committees received
the first “Havana Syndrome” reports, the
Committees have focused intently on the
anomalous health incidents (“AHIs”) that
have afflicted United States Government
personnel, including many in the Intel-
ligence Community (IC) and other United
States Government personnel. Provisions of
the Act reflect that continuing, bicameral
and bipartisan effort.

The Biden Administration also has pursued
its own initiatives. As directed by Congress,
it earlier this year appointed a senior offi-
cial, within the National Security Council,
to oversee the government’s response to
AHIs. Additionally, in recent months, a
widely-discussed assessment concluded that
a majority of reported AHIs can be explained
by medical conditions or environmental or
technical factors, and that it is unlikely that
a foreign actor—including Russia—is en-
gaged in a sustained, global campaign in-
volving hundreds of incidents without detec-
tion. But the assessment left other cases un-
explained, including a small subset that the
IC continues to scrutinize most closely.

Around the same time, an IC panel of ex-
perts determined that certain AHIs cannot
be explained by environmental or medical
conditions, but could be due to external
stimuli. While acknowledging important in-
formation gaps, the panel further determined
that pulsed electromagnetic energy—and, in
some cases, ultrasound—plausibly might ex-
plain AHIs’ core characteristics; and that
psychosocial factors alone could not account
for those characteristics, though they might
cause some other incidents or contribute to
long-term symptoms.

These findings advance the United States’
understanding of AHIs. But these findings
are also heavily qualified, tentative, and
based on a developing and incomplete body
of evidence and scientific and medical
knowledge. Most important, as the Commit-
tees wish to stress, these recent develop-
ments do not justify shifting the Executive
Branch’s AHI-related activities into a lower
gear, or discrediting the reports of AHI vic-
tims.

The core work on AHIs—to include exam-
ination of a potential role by one or more
foreign actors—must continue apace. As
with prior inquiries into complex and murky
intelligence problems, unraveling the AHI
mystery fully may take time. It might be
years before the United States reaches defi-
nitive conclusions about exactly who, or
what, is behind AHIs.

The Administration has acknowledged that
a great deal remains to be done. Indeed,
much more evidence will have to be gath-
ered. Plausible theories regarding responsi-
bility for AHIs will have to be weighed
against a record that will grow and change
over time, and potentially may have to be
revisited if circumstances warrant. And no
plausible theory should be ruled out or
downplayed prematurely.

Success will depend on many factors.
Among other things, it will be important to
have a well-resourced cadre of “cross-
cleared” individuals, at all relevant IC ele-
ments and other Executive Branch organiza-
tions, who can readily review and analyze all
relevant intelligence and information, and
without hindrances. The Committees long

have emphasized this, with respect to AHI
and many other priority intelligence mat-
ters. However, the Executive Branch has yet
to take all necessary steps, to do away with
excessive compartmentation and unneces-
sary bureaucracy; and to ensure that, for
AHI and for other vital missions, the right
people consistently and easily can access
necessary information. That will have to
change.

Treatment also must remain a matter of
highest priority. All AHI victims must be en-
couraged to file prompt reports of their expe-
riences, and without fear of being disbelieved
or dismissed. They and their families must
receive the highest quality medical and
other care and must receive that care imme-
diately. Thus far, some bureaucratic road-
blocks to the provision of care have been re-
moved—but there is no excuse for any to re-
main. They must be dismantled. And new
ones must not be erected.

Above all, there can be no slowing down, in
the investigation into AHIs and in the treat-
ment of AHI victims and their families. To
do so would risk signaling—to those individ-
uals, to the broader IC workforce, and to the
wider world—that, though it prioritized the
issue most highly for a discrete time, the
United States is “moving on” from AHIs.

That cannot be allowed to happen. And the
Committees will continue to conduct vig-
orous oversight, to prevent it from hap-
pening.

PART III: UNCLASSIFIED CONGRESSIONAL
DIRECTION

This Joint Explanatory Statement incor-
porates by reference, and the Executive
Branch shall comply with, all direction con-
tained in the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence Report to accompany the Intel-
ligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2022 (S. Rept. 117–37) and in the House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence
Report to accompany the Intelligence Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (H. Rept.
117–156).

The Executive Branch is further directed
as follows:

*Assessment of Intelligence Community Counter-
narcotics Capabilities.*

The Committees direct the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, in consultation with
such other Federal Government entities as
the Director determines appropriate, to sub-
mit an assessment to the congressional in-
telligence committees within 120 days of en-
actment of this Act, on the status of the In-
telligence Community’s (1) counternarcotics
capabilities and resourcing with regard to in-
telligence collection and analysis; (2) opera-
tional support to foreign liaison partners;
and (3) operational capacity to support the
counternarcotics mission of the Federal Gov-
ernment. The assessment shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a clas-
sified annex.

*Assessment of Intelligence Community’s Intel-
ligence-Sharing Relationships with Latin
American Partners in Counternarcotics.*

The Committees direct the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, in consultation with
such other Federal Government entities as
the Director determines appropriate, to sub-
mit an assessment to the congressional in-
telligence committees within 120 days of en-
actment of this Act, on the intelligence-
sharing relationships of the Intelligence
Community with foreign partners in Latin
America on counternarcotics matters. The
assessment shall be submitted in unclassi-
fied form, but may include a classified
annex.

*Report on Intelligence Community Support to
Visas Mantis Program.*

The Committees direct the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, in consultation with